

Message Text

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TO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS

USCINCSO

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AO, UR

SUBJECT: ANGOLA: GUIDANCE FOR DISCUSSION AND
MEDIA USE

1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE ARA
POSTS WITH GUIDANCE ON ANGOLA FOR USE IN DEALING
WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS OR MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES.

2. REASON FOR US CONCERN: THE US DECIDED TO UNDERTAKE
A SMALL COVERT MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN SUPPORT
OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FNLA)
AND THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF
ANGOLA (UNITA) LAST JULY. THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN MORE
THAN 6 MONTHS AFTER THE USSR BEGAN ITS STEPPED UP MILITARY
AID PROGRAM TO THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION
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OF ANGOLA (MPLA). THE US WAS MOVED BY THE FOLLOWING
CONSIDERATIONS:

-- FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE USSR ACQUIRED A MILITARY

CAPABILITY TO INTERVENE ANYWHERE ON THE GLOBE WITH ITS FLEET AND LONG-RANGE TRANSPORTS, IT HAD EXERCISED THIS

OPTION 8 THOUSAND MILES FROM HOME IN SUPPORT OF A MINORITY MARXIST FACTION IN AN AREA OF THE WORLD IN WHICH THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANY SOVIET OR RUSSIAN INTEREST. THIS FLEW IN THE FACE OF OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT IF THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE TO PROCEED TOWARDS A GENUINE EASING OF TENSIONS NEITHER SIDE WILL ACT IN WAYS WHICH WOULD ESCALATE TENSE SITUATIONS INTO CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. (SEE THE MAY 1972 SUMMIT DECLARATION REGARDING "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS.") IT IS THE U.S. VIEW THAT THIS PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL RELATIONS IS NOT SIMPLY A MATTER OF ABSTRACT GOOD WILL BUT IS AT THE HEART OF HOW TWO RESPONSIBLE GREAT POWERS MUST CONDUCT THEMSELVES IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, ONE GREAT POWER ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A SPECIAL POSITION OF INFLUENCE BASED ON MILITARY INTERVENTION, THERE WILL INEVITABLY BE PRESSURES ON THE OTHER GREAT POWER TO REACT. THIS CAN LEAD TO A CHAIN OF ACTION THAT EMBROILS THE GREAT POWERS IN MAJOR CRISES. IT IS PRECISELY THAT PATTERN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION'S ACTION IN ANGOLA HAS THREATENED TO PRECIPITATE.

3 IN THE CASE OF ANGOLA, THE PRESSURES ON THE U.S. TO REACT WERE THE FOLLOWING:

--IF THE MPLA WERE TO ESTABLISH ITSELF IN ANGOLA IN THE FACE OF RESISTANCE FROM "LIBERATION" GROUPINGS SUPPORTED BY ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA, IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO EXPECT AN INCREASE IN REGIONAL TENSION AND PERHAPS SOME EFFORT BY THE MPLA TO USE E.G. THE LEVERAGE OF THE BENGUELA RAILROAD, ON WHICH BOTH ZAMBIA AND ZAIRE ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT, TO PRESSURE ITS NEIGHBORS INTO CHANGING THEIR ORIENTATION OR RISK BEING TOPPLED.

--SIMILARLY, THE COMING TO POWER OF THE RADICAL MPLA WOULD
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PROBABLY MEAN AN END TO THE PROMISING DIALOGUE BETWEEN BLACK AND SOUTH AFRICA, PARTICULARLY IF PRESSURE ON ZAMBIA PUSHED THAT KEY COUNTRY IN THE DIALOGUE TO THE LEFT. SUPPORT FOR THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) GUERRILLA ACTIVITY AGAINST NEIGHBORING NAMIBIA WOULD VERY PROBABLY INCREASE. IN RESPONSE TO THE ONGOING DIALOGUE WITH BLACK AFRICA, VORSTER IS AT LEAST BEGINNING VERY SLOWLY TO MODERATE HIS APARTHEID POLICY; HERE LIES THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO AN EVENTUAL BLOODY NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT WITH ALL ITS GRIM IMPLICATIONS. WHETHER THE POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE TROUBLE INHERENT IN AN MPLA VICTORY WOULD MATERIALIZE, WOULD DEPEND VERY MUCH ON HOW THAT

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VICTORY WAS ACHIEVED, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH MPLA REMAINED UNDER SOVIET/CUBAN INFLUENCE. TO THE EXTENT THAT MPLA WAS PRESSURED INTO SHARING ITS POWER WITH MORE MODERATE UNITA AND PERHAPS FNLA ELEMENTS, IT WOULD BE MORE INCLINED TO FOLLOW A PRAGMATIC AND COOPERATIVE REGIONAL POLICY. CONVERSELY, IF MOSCOW SUCCEEDED IN DESTABILIZING THE WHOLE SITUATION IN SOUTH CENTRAL AFRICA WITH ITS AID TO THE MPLA, IT COULD ONLY BE ENCOURAGED TO TRY SIMILAR ADVENTURES ELSEWHERE.

--RADICAL PRESSURE AGAINST ZAIRE, ZAMBIA AND NAMIBIA COULD TAKE PLACE EVEN IF THE SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE WERE TO RECEDE, BUT IT WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO OCCUR IF MOSCOW AND CUBA REMAINED IN A POSITION TO CONTINUE THE "SPOILING" ROLE THEY PLAYED AT THE OAU SUMMIT, DISCOURAGING ALL COMPROMISE.

4. USAIMS. BY INTERVENING WITH COVERT ASSISTANCE, THE US HOPED TO SIGNAL THE USSR THAT IT WAS CONCERNED, AND ALLOW MOSCOW TO WITHDRAW GRACEFULLY WITHOUT PUBLIC CONFRONTATION.

5. THE PURPOSE OF US AID WAS (A) TO MAKE CLEAR TO MOSCOW THAT WE CONSIDERED ITS LACK OF RESTRAINT IN A DELICATE TRANSITION PHASE IN ANGOLA TO HAVE VIOLATED OUR MOSCOW SUMMIT UNDERSTANDING AND THE SPIRIT OF DETENTE; (B) TO DETER THE USSR FROM FURTHER SUCH ADVENTURES IN THE FUTURE;

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AND (C) BY STRENGTHENING THE FNLA/UNITA FORCES, TO PREVENT AN EASY MPLA VICTORY AND PROVIDE THE MILITARY PREREQUISITES FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF ALL THREE POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AND ENCOURAGE THE EMERGENCE OF A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD NOT DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION IN SOUTH CENTRAL AFRICA.

6. THE OAU SUMMIT WILL HAVE GIVEN MOSCOW PAUSE FOR REFLECTION. IT WILL SEE THAT ABOUT HALF OF AFRICA IS OPPOSED TO ITS POLICY OF IMPOSING THE MPLA ON ANGOLA. WHAT IT DOES IN THE COMING WEEKS WILL DEPEND ON ITS PERCEPTION OF THE LONG-TERM GAINS, LOSSES AND RISKS OF PURSUING ITS PRESENT POLICY OF APPARENT OPPOSITION TO AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND EFFORT AT CONCILIATION.

7. INFORMATION THEMES: IN ADDITION TO APPLYING DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON MOSCOW, DIRECTLY AND BY PROXY OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO MAXIMIZE THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA LOSS FROM ITS ANGOLAN ADVENTURE. WE

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WILL NEED TO BE CAREFUL, IN SO DOING, HOWEVER, NOT TO PLAY

INTO MOSCOW'S HANDS BY THE MANNER WE UNDERLINE SOVIET WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO INTERVENE ON A GLOBAL SCALE. WITHIN THESE LIMITATIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET POSITION IS VULNERABLE TO THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTATION:

--THE MPLA CLAIM THAT THE USSR AND CUBANS ARE PROVIDING AID TO A "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENT TO SAVE THEM FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA IS TOTALLY FALSE. THE OAU DID NOT INVITE MOSCOW TO SEND AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO IMPOSE ITS MARXIST FRIENDS ON A COUNTRY NO LONGER UNDER COLONIALISM, IN WHICH THE MARXIST FACTION REPRESENTS A QUARTER OF THE POPULATION. AT THE TIME THAT THE USSR STEPPED UP ITS AID TO THE MPLA, AN AGREEMENT OF PRINCIPLE HAD ALREADY BEEN REACHED TO FORM A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN WHICH ALL THREE FACTIONS WOULD BE EQUALLY REPRESENTED. WHAT WAS REQUIRED TO PREVENT CIVIL WAR AT THIS JUNCTURE WAS RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF EVERYONE CONCERNED. BUT THE SOVIET ARMS SENT THE MPLA BEGINNING IN THE LATE AUTUMN OF 1974 DESTROYED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCENTIVE TO THE MPLA TO HOW RESTRAINT, SECRET

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AND IN MARCH, A PERIOD WHEN SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS INCREASED IN INTENSITY, THE MPLA TURNED ITS GUNS ON THE FNLA.

--THE US DID NOT DECIDE TO REACT AGAINST THIS EFFORT TO GIVE ONE SIDE A DECISIVE MILITARY ADVANTAGE UNTIL MID-JULY 1975--MORE THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER SOVIET ARMS HAD BEGUN TO POUR INTO CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE AND LUANDA.

--IT IS THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS WHO APPEAR TO BE THE MOST OPPOSED TO ANY CEASEFIRE IN ANGOLA. THEY SEEM DETERMINED TO FIGHT TO THE LAST ANGOLAN IN SUPPORT OF THEIR SPECIAL AIMS. CUBA IS RENEWING ITS CREDENTIALS AS A "REVOLUTIONARY" LEADER, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN ITS RECENTLY ACQUIRED RESPECTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA. THE USSR APPARENTLY SEES AN OPPORTUNITY IN ANGOLA TO SHIFT SLIGHTLY THE "CORRELATION OF WORLD FORCES" IN ITS FAVOR AS PART OF ITS GLOBAL POWER STRATEGY. BUT NEITHER OF THESE AIMS SERVES THE INTERESTS OF A UNITED AFRICA, OR A PEACEFUL ANGOLA.

--IT IS STRANGE TO SEE STATES CLAIMING TO SPEAK IN THE NAME OF AFRICA, BEING SO DETERMINED TO IMPOSE THE MPLA ON THE MAJORITY OF ANGOLANS THAT THEY PREFER TO GO ON FIGHTING, RATHER THAN TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND CONCILIATION. WHAT SORT OF AFRICAN SOLIDARITY IS THIS?

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--ENDEMIC UNREST IN THE 3RD AND 4TH WORLDS PROVIDES MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO THE USSR TO FISH IN TROUBLED WATERS IN SUPPORT OF "FRIENDS." IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THE U.S.

IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT FOR IT-
SELF TAT IT COMSIDERS TE SOVIET MOVE IN ANGOLA AS RUNNING
COUNTER TO THE CRUCIAL PRINCIPLES OF AVOIDANCE OF UNI-
LATERAL ADVANTAGE AND SCRUPULOUS CONCERN FOR THE INTERESTS
OF OTHERS WHICH WE HAVE JOINTLY ENUNCIATED. IF THE USSR
IS ALLOWED TO INTERVENE EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT
COST IN AN INTERNAL CONFLICT IN AFRICA, IT MAY BE EN-
COURAGED TO TRY ELSEWHERE. THE EFFECT OF THIS EFFORT
TO HAVE THE BEST OF BOTH DETENTE AND "NATIONAL LIBERATION"
WILL BE TO UNDERMINE WHAT DETENTE POLICY HAS ACHIEVED,
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ENCOURAGE SERIOUS SOVIET MISCALCULATION OF US WILL TO
RESIST, AND CORRESPONDINGLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF
DANGEROUS E/W CONFRONTATION. (AS NOTED ABOVE, THIS THEME
OF SOVIET GLOBAL INTERVENTION SHOULD ONLY BE USED IF
LIKELY TO PROVOKE INCREASED SUSPICION OF USSR AND CONCERN
TO RESIST USSR EXPANSIONISM RATHER THAN DESIRE FOR
ACCOMMODATION OR FEAR OF U.S. OVER-REACTION.)

8. YOU HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED A NUMBER OF REPORTS
ON SOVIET/CU0AN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA AND MORE RECENTLY
GUIDANCE ON OUR ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS FOR THAT
INVOLVEMENT. (CFR:ISSUE 2 OF 1/14/76)
THE FOREGOING SHOULD BE DRAWN ON AS APPROPRIATE IN
DISCUSSION TO AMPLIFY U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES. KISSINGER

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